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ABSTRACT
Malnutrition is one ofthe biggest problemsfacing India today.
Thus, the functioning of the Public Distribution System (PDS)-
which provides subsidized food to hundreds of millions of people-
is critically important. However, while numerous studies have
evaluated the performance of the PDS in rural areas, there is a
notable lack of research in urban slums, a rapidly growing
population. Through interviews with PDS beneficiaries and other
stakeholders, the present study examines the PDS in one slum in
Delhi and finds numerous problems, including low-quality grain,
corruption, and the lack of an effective complaint mechanism.
Although several states in India have recently strengthened their
PDS, the under-utilization of the PDS in urban areas makes it more
difficult to muster the political will to initiate reforms.
Unfortunately, the Right to Food Act limits PDS benefits to fifty
percent ofthe urban population, thus ensuring that this urban under-
utilization will continue.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malnutrition is a serious, persistent problem in India'-the country
has the highest number of malnourished persons in the world.2 Almost one-
third of Indian children are underweight3 and approximately 39% are
stunted.' In 2014, the Global Hunger Index, which uses a multidimensional
approach to evaluating hunger throughout the world,s ranked India 55th out
of the 76 countries considered.6 The Indian government has implemented
1. Helping India Combat Persistently High Rates ofMalnutrition, WORLD BANK
(May 13, 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/05/13/helping-india-
combat-persistently-high-rates-of-malnutrition.
2. Himanshu, Poverty and Food Security in India I (Asian Dev. Bank, Working
Paper No. 369, 2013), available at
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/3039 I/ewp-369.pdf.
3. Rukmini S., Malnourishment Declined Sharply Among Children in India, THE
HINDU (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/malnourishment-
declined-sharply-among-children-in-india-says-unicef/article6497025.ece.
4. Rukmini S., Child Stunting Drops Sharply in India, THE HINDU (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.thehindu.com/data/child-stunting-drops-sharply-in-india-new-data-
shows/article6595607.ece.
5. INT'L FOOD POLIcY RESEARCH INST., GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX: THE CHALLENGE
OF HIDDEN HUNGER 7 (2014) (considering undernourishment, the proportion of children
that are underweight, and child mortality in measuring hunger).
6. Id. at 16 tbl. 2.1.
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several programs designed to reduce hunger,' although by the government's
own admission, these programs have had only limited success.' Indeed, the
daily caloric intake of India's poorest citizens, who might be expected to
benefit most from these programs, has actually decreased since 2009.9
Jean Dreze and other scholars have written extensively on poverty and
malnutrition in India. o However, research on one of the most important
programs-the Public Distribution System (PDS), which is the world's
largest food safety net program"-has tended to focus only on rural areas.
The present study seeks to extend this prior research by examining the PDS
in one slum in Delhi. This will provide a useful point of comparison and
will highlight the challenges facing an ever-increasing segment of India's
population-the urban poor'2-that endure significant food shortages.3
Beyond the introduction, Part II of this report provides an overview of
the right to food in India, including relevant constitutional provisions, a brief
history of the PDS, and recent developments in the courts. Part III reviews
existing research on the PDS in Delhi. Part IV sets forth this study's
rationale and methodology. Next, Part V presents the study's findings and
analysis in light of the government's obligations under the National Food
Security Act and the Right to Food Case. Finally, Part VI discusses
important implications of the study's findings, including the fact that Delhi's
PDS has not experienced the revival seen in other states and that the
7. See generally RIGHT To FOOD CAMPAIGN, SUPREME COURT ORDERS ON THE
RIGHT TO FOOD: A TOOL FOR ACTION §§ 2.1-2.11 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimeratoolforaction.pdf
(discussing government programs concerning the right to food).
8. GOV'T OF INDIA, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: STATES OF INDIA REPORT
2010, at iv (2010) ("[T]he country has been moderately successful in reducing poverty,
though the same cannot be said in respect of combating hunger. . . .").
9. Shareen Hertel, Hungry for Justice: Social Mobilization on the Right to Food in
India, 46 DEV. & CHANGE 72, 72 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Diane Coffey et al., Stunting Among Children: Facts and Implications,
48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 68, 68 (2013); Angus Deaton & Jean Dreze, Food and Nutrition
in India: Facts and Interpretations, 44 EcON. & POL. WKLY. 42, 42 (2009); Jean Dreze
& Reetika Khera, The BPL Census and a Possible Alternative, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
54, 54 (2010) (discussing an alternative method for calculating which households qualify
for food assistance).
11. Jessica Meeker, Is More Inclusive More Effective? The Impact ofMore Inclusive
Public Distribution Systems, LANSA (June 24, 2014),
http://lansasouthasia.org/blog/more-inclusive-more-effective-impact-more-inclusive-
public-distribution-systems.
12. See GOV'T OF INDIA, INDIA: URBAN POVERTY REPORT 2009 1 (2009) (discussing
the "urbanization" of poverty).
13. See, e.g., R. Sairam, Malnutrition High Among Urban Poor Children, THE HINDU
(Mar. 31, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Coimbatore/malnutrition-high-
among-urban-poor-children/article4566729.ece.
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limitation of benefits under the National Food Security Act to 50% of the
urban population is problematic.
II. THE RIGHT TO FOOD IN INDIA
A. The Constitution
India's Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to food.
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the right to life under Article
21 to include the right to food.14 In addition, the Constitution's Directive
Principles of State Policy, which are not enforceable in court but must be
applied by the State in making laws,"s impose an obligation on the
government to guarantee at least a minimal level of nutrition to its citizens.16
Article 39, for example, requires the government to "direct its policy towards
securing ... that the citizens ... have the right to an adequate means of
livelihood."" Article 41 requires the State to make, within its economic
limits, "effective provision for securing the right . .. to public assistance in
cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other
cases of undeserved want."" Finally, Article 47 declares that the
government "shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard
of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its
primary duties."'9
B. The Targeted Public Distribution System
Although recognition of the right to food is a relatively recent
occurrence, India has long maintained food assistance programs for its needy
citizens.2 0 The British colonial government introduced India's PDS in 1939
as a wartime rationing measure to ensure grains were available in urban
14. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630 (India)
("The right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society. That would take within its sweep
the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable
accommodation to live in."); see also Justice M.B. Shah, The Indian Supreme Court
Acknowledges the Right to Food as a Human Right, AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., Feb. 2006,
at 24, 25-26 (discussing Indian Supreme Court right-to-food cases).
15. INDIA CONST. art. 37 ("The provisions contained in this Part shall not be
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply
these principles in making laws.").
16. Id. art. 39(a).
17. Id.
18. Id. art. 41.
19. Id. art. 47.
20. Gov'T OF INDIA, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF TARGETED PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 1 (2005) [hereinafter "TPDS EVALUATION"].
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Bombay.21 Over the course of several decades, it was expanded significantly
in efforts to alleviate hunger and poverty.2 2 After the World Food Summit
in 1996, India made additional efforts to address the system's shortcomings,
such as urban bias, which culminated in the system's transformation into the
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) in 1997.23 This new system
focused specifically on providing food aid to the poor, rather than providing
aid to all people in poor areas as was done before.24
Specifically, the TPDS aims to identify families below the poverty line
(BPL) in each state and ensure that each of these families can obtain certain
quantities of grain at subsidized prices.2 5 The Food Corporation of India, an
arm of the central government, purchases food grains at predetermined
minimum support prices, and sells them to the states at a uniform issue price
for state distribution through the TPDS.26 State governments can then further
subsidize PDS foods or offer additional foods through the fair price shops
(FPS), where the PDS grains are sold.27 States are charged with the task of
identifying2 8 which households qualify as BPL and which fall under the
AAY (Antyodaya Anna Yojana) program, which contains additional
subsidies for the "poorest of the poor."2 9 States can also allocate additional
21. Amit Kumar Gupta & Anupama Saxena, Significance of Public Distribution
System in an Indian State-Uttar Pradesh, 3 INT'L J. MGMT. & SOC. SCI. RES. 1, 1 (2014).
For a historical overview of the PDS in India, see TPDS EVALUATION, supra note 20, at
1-3.
22. Gupta & Saxena, supra note 21, at 1-2.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. (noting that the TPDS targets the "poor in all areas," unlike its predecessor,
which focused on "all in poor areas").
25. TPDS EVALUATION, supra note 20, at 3.
26. Raghbendra Jha et al., Food Subsidy, Income Transfer and the Poor 4 (ASARC,
Working Paper No. 2011/16, 2011).
27. Prasad Krishnamurthy et al., Food Price Subsidies and Nutrition: Evidence from
State Reforms to India's Public Distribution System 9 n. 15 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 2345675, 2014),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2345675 ("Different states can offer
different commodities in addition to rice, wheat, kerosene, and sugar. For example,
Chhattisgarh offers rations of iodized salt and, following 2012, also offers a ration of
pulses."); SAKSHI BALANI, FUNCTIONING OF THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: AN
ANALYTICAL REPORT 5 (2013), available at
http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/I 388728622-TPDS%2OThem
atic%20Note.pdf ("Many states further subsidise the price of food grains before selling
it to beneficiaries.").
28. Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 27, at 9 ("State governments are responsible for
identifying the PDS entitlements of individual households .... ).
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food grains to families above the poverty line (APL) at less subsidized
prices.3 0
Nationally, the TPDS currently serves approximately 40 million BPL
families and 24 million AAY families.' The scope of the program is
immense-in May 2015, for example, the states took a combined 12.6 lakh
tons of rice and 8.29 lakh tons of wheat from the Central Government for the
TPDS (including BPL, AAY, and APL cardholders).32 While this program
is undoubtedly helpful for some, there are also a number of well-documented
problems with its functioning.33 Corruption is a major challenge, with large
amounts of grain-more than half, by some estimates-being diverted to the
black market.34 At times, beneficiaries are overcharged, given low-quality
grains, or given less than their full share.3 s Targeting the program has proved
to be difficult, with large numbers of the poor excluded from the program
and many of the non-poor granted subsidies.36 The efficiency and
effectiveness of the program also varies wildly-in some states, it functions
reasonably well, while in others, it is languishing.37 Recent reforms,
however, have addressed some of these issues and led to remarkable
improvement, at least in some states.
30. Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 27, at 9 ("States can also secure food grains for
above-poverty-line (APL) households, but at a much higher rate.").
31. BALANI, supra note 27, at 4 tbl. 2.
32. See DEP'T OF FOOD & PUB. DISTRIBUTION, FOOD GRAIN BULLETIN 2 (2015),
available at http://dfpd.nic.in/writereaddata/images/MAY-2015.pdf (listing the offtake
of foodgrains). "Offtake" refers to the amount of foodgrains taken by the states from the
Food Corporation of India for distribution through the TPDS. See Reetika Khera, Trends
in Diversion of Grain from the Public Distribution System, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 106,
107 (2011).
33. Jean Dreze, Democracy and the Right to Food, 39 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1723,
1727 (2004) ("[A]bout half of the grain meant for distribution to poor households through
the PDS seems to end up in the black market, rising to 80 per cent in Bihar and
Jharkhand.").
34. Id.
35. Jean Dreze & Reetika Khera, Understanding Leakages in the Public Distribution
System, 50 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 39,42 (2015) (noting "many instances" of overcharging
or under-weighing); N.C. Saxena, Hunger, Under-Nutrition and Food Security in India
65-66 (Chronic Poverty Research Ctr. & Indian Inst. of Pub. Admin., Working Paper No.
44, 2011), available at
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication-files2/CPRC-IIPA%2044-new.pdf.
36. See BALANI, supra note 27, at 7 (estimating that 61% of the eligible population
was excluded from the BPL list, while 25% of non-poor households were included).
37. See Reetika Khera, Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and
Explanations, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 36, 36 (2011) (reviewing the TPDS in nine
states).
38. Id. ("Contrary to a common belief in policy debates ... that the PDS is an
irreparably dysfunctional scheme, this survey finds that many state governments have
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In Delhi, the TPDS is managed by the Department of Food, Supplies,
and Consumer Affairs." The Delhi State Civil Supplies Corporation
oversees the transportation f commodities from regional godowns operated
by the Food Corporation of India to the 2,409 fair price shops in Delhi.40 The
Delhi government administers a targeted PDS (unlike certain states, which
provide universal or near-universal benefits)4 1-each eligible family is
entitled one ration card, which dictates the quantity and price of the PDS
goods.4 2
C. The Right To Food Case
A common argument in the human rights literature is that the right to
food is included within the right to life.43 If this is correct, the high levels of
undernourishment throughout India are, at the very least, a cause for concern.
Moreover, when taken to its logical conclusion, the government's failure to
adequately address malnutrition is a violation of the Indian Constitution.44
This line of thinking lead the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) to
file a writ petition in the Supreme Court45 against the Union of India under
undertaken a series of measures that have made the PDS functional."); Raghav Puri,
Reforming the Public Distribution System: Lessons from Chhattisgarh, 47 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 21, 21 (2012) ("Reforms to the public distribution system in Chhattisgarh that
focused on extending coverage, improving delivery and increasing transparency have led
to its remarkable revival.").
39. About Us, GOV'T OF NCT OF DELHI,
http://www.delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/DOIT_Food/food/home/ (last updated Mar.
22, 2014).
40. Public Distribution System, Gov'T OF NCT OF DELHI,
http://delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/doitdscsc/DSCSC/Home/Activities/Distribution
+under+PDS/Public+Distribution+System/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2016); Fair Price Shop
Details, GNCT OF DELHI, http://nfs.delhi.gov.in/Citizen/FPS Details.aspx?%2f (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016) (listing active Fair Price Shops in Delhi).
41. See JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, AN UNCERTAIN GLORY: INDIA AND ITS
CONTRADICTIONS 194 (2013) (noting that many states have moved to a more inclusive
or even "universal" PDS).




43. Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, The Right to Life Is the Right o Food: People's
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union ofIndia & Others, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 15, 17 (2010),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/17/3corsi.pdf?rd=1.
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/411836/.
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Article 32(1) of the Constitution.46 PUCL argued that the Court had
previously interpreted Article 21 (the right to life) as the right to a life with
dignity, and not mere survival-thus, the right to life implies a right to food
as well.47 This petition led to a fifteen-year, ongoing public-interest
litigation, PUCL v. Union ofIndia, resulting in numerous interim orders.48
The central argument in the petition was that because food is essential
for survival, the fundamental right to life guaranteed in Article 21 implies
the right to food.49 PUCL argued that the state had been negligent in its
drought relief work and in its ineffective handling of the TPDS system.so
The petitioners sought (a) immediate open-ended employment in drought-
affected villages; (b) "gratuitous relief' to persons unable to work; (c)
increased food entitlements under the TPDS; and (d) subsidized food grain
to all families provided by the central government.1
In its July 23, 2001 order, the Supreme Court began by setting
priorities: providing for the aged, disabled, destitute women, destitute men
who were in danger of starvation, pregnant and lactating mothers, and
destitute children.52 The Court passed an interim order directing the state
governments to open all closed PDS shops within a week.s" In subsequent
interim orders, the Court required the government to introduce or comply
46. INDIA CONST. art. 32(1) ("The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.").
47. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1
S.C.C. 608 (India) (holding that "[t]he right to life includes the right to live with human
dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter . . . ."); Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal
Totame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630 (India) ("The right to life is guaranteed in any civilized
society. That would take within its sweep the right to food . . . .").
48. An interim order is an order that remains applicable for the duration of the case.
If and when the Supreme Court issues a final judgment and disposes of the case, some
of these orders are likely to be incorporated in the judgment. See YAMINI JAISHANKAR &
JEAN DREZE, SUPREME COURT ORDERS ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD: A TOOL FOR ACTION 4
(2005), available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc
(discussing these interim orders).
49. Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 43, at 15.
50. JAISHANKAR & DREZE, supra note 48. The PDS System is a means of distributing
food grains and other basic commodities at subsidized prices through "fair price shops."
Every family is supposed to have a ration card. In 1997, the PDS was "targeted"-
different ration cards were issued to households Below the Poverty Line (BPL) and
Above the Poverty Line (APL), with each category having different entitlements. See
ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 42.
51. JAISHANKAR & DREZE,supra note 48.
52. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
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with further food schemes, including (but not limited to): (1) the TPDS,
which restricted subsidies from the central government to those in need;14
(2) the AAY, to provide additional food assistance to the poorest households
through a special ration card;ss (3) the Midday Meal Scheme, which required
a minimum content of 300 calories and 8 to 12 grams of protein per school
day for a minimum of 200 days per year;" (4) the National Old Age Pension
Scheme," with court-ordered pension payments to be made on the seventh
day of every month;58 and (5) the Integrated Children Development Services,
which the Court ordered must provide certain populations with minimum
nutrition5 9 per day as follows: children up to the age of six were entitled to
300 calories and 8 to 10 grams of protein; adolescent girls were entitled to
54. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://secommissioners.org/CourtOrders/Orders/allfoodschemes_281101 .pdf.
55. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Apr. 20, 2004), reprinted in JAISHANKAR & DREZE, supra
note 48, at 53-57. In 2001, Antyodaya cards were introduced as a sub-category of BPL
cards. However, the Supreme Court later stated that the Antyodaya program should not
be restricted to those with a BPL card. See id. ("The Government of India shall issue,
within two months, guidelines so that the existing condition of possession of a BPL card
for inclusion in AAY category is dispensed with.").
56. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001), reprinted in JAISHANKAR & DREZE, supra
note 48, at 43-44. The Supreme Court passed an interim order, which directed state
government to provide cooked mid-day meals in primary schools. Every child who
attends a government or government-assisted school is entitled to a cooked mid-day meal
every day. Id. The scheme was extended to include Class 10. People's Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order,
Apr. 20, 2004).
57. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001). This scheme was launched in 1995 to
provide "old age pensions" to senior citizens (aged 65 years or older). The government
of India issued directions for covering all BPL individuals above the age of 60 under this
scheme. The National Old Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS) is primarily focused on old
men and women with no assured means of subsistence. See Office Memorandum from
the Gov't of India (June 30, 2011), available at
http://nsap.nic.in/Guidelines/english-oaps.pdf (noting the requirements for eligibility,
although the eligibility conditions vary from state to state, as does the coverage of the
scheme); NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, KNow YOUR RIGHTS: ELDERLY PEOPLE 12
(2011) ("The amount of old age pension varies in the different States . ... ").
58. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://sccommissioners.org/CourtOrders/Orders/allfoodschemes_281101 .pdf.
59. See Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme, MINISTRY OF
WOMEN & CHILD DEV., http://icds-wcd.nic.in/icds/icds.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016)
(listing the nutritional benefits per beneficiary per day under the ICDS).
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500 calories and 20 to 25 grams of protein; pregnant women and nursing
mothers were entitled to 500 calories and 20 to 25 grams of protein; and
malnourished children were entitled to 600 calories and 16 to 20 grams of
protein."o This scheme has been revised over time, however, with variations
to the method of distributions and the recipients.'
Each of these schemes, along with the others that were addressed by
the Court,62 wre introduced to make food accessible to all Indian citizens in
order to end starvation, malnutrition, and drought.63 However, these
programs have not achieved their intended goals, as India continues to have
some of the highest levels of hunger, stunted children, and poorly fed women
in the world.'
III. EXISTING RESEARCH
Researchers have been studying India's PDS for over twenty-five
years6' and have documented both its successes and shortcomings.6 6
However, much of the literature thus far has focused on rural communities,
as surveys in villages (rather than urban areas) are prevalent.67  Little
60. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://sccommissioners.org/CourtOrders/Orders/allfoodschemes281101.pdf.
61. See Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme, supra note 59.
62. See Legal Action: Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN,
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2013)
(collecting Supreme Court orders).
63. A Brief Introduction to the Campaign, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN,
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/campaign/campaign.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
64. Zia Haq, Hunger Haunts India, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/hunger-haunts-india/article 1-611546.aspx
(citing the International Food Policy Research Institute's Global Hunger Index 2010).
65. See, e.g., K R VENUGOPAL, DELIVERANCE FROM HUNGER: THE PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN INDIA 121 (1992); Deepak Ahluwalia, Public Distribution of
Food in India: Coverage, Targeting and Leakages, 18 FOOD POL'Y 33, 33 (1993); IYR
Krishna Rao, An Experiment in Food Security, 28 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1911, 1911
(1993).
66. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Jean Dreze & Reetika Khera, Rural Poverty and the Public Distribution
System, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 55,55 (2013); Jyotsna Jain & Mihir Shah, Antyodaya
Anna Yojana and Mid-Day Meals in MP, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 5076, 5076 (2005)
(noting that the districts studied "are some of the most neglected and under-developed
areas of the country"); Reetika Khera, Access to the Targeted Public Distribution System:
A Case Study in Rajasthan, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 51, 51 (2008) ("For this study, data
was collected from nearly 400 households in eight villages . . . ."); Khera, supra note 37,
at 37 ("Selected villages were a random sample from the list of census villages with a
population of 500-1,500."); Andaleeb Rahman, Revival of Rural PDS: Expansion and
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research has been done on the functioning of the PDS in urban areas,
although some early studies argued that the PDS infrastructure favored urban
areas.6 ' The authors of the present report were able to find only one
published research paper focused specifically on the TPDS in Delhi-a
report by the Central Vigilance Committee,69 which was created by the
government pursuant to the Supreme Court's order to combat "large-scale
corruption" in the TPDS.o The Committee met with stakeholders of the
Delhi TPDS and detailed various problems with its functioning, including
inadequate oversight," large gaps in coverage of people below the poverty
line, a large number of fake ration cards, beneficiaries not receiving their
entitlements, large-scale diversion of grains (to the black market), and a lack
of proper accountability."
Two working papers by the Centre for Civil Society discuss Delhi's
TPDS.n' The first, from 2012, found that most BPL and AAY cardholders
were regularly receiving their full entitlement of grain and sugar.74 However,
the paper also noted several problems in the system's functioning.5
Although fair price shops were supposed to be open Monday through
Saturday from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 7 p.m., most were open ten days
Outreach I (Indira Gandhi Inst. of Dev. Research, Working Paper No. 2014-012, 2014),
available at http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2014-012.pdf.
68. S. Mahendra Dev & M H Suryanarayana, Is PDS Urban Biased and Pro-Rich?:
An Evaluation, 26 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2357, 2357 (1991); Stephen Howes & Shikha
Jha, Urban Bias in Indian Public Distribution System, 27 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1022,
1027 (1992).
69. Report on Delhi: Executive Summary, CENT. VIGILANCE COMM.,
http://pdscvc.nic.in (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (follow "Report for Delhi" hyperlink; then
follow "Executive Summary" hyperlink). The full report is available at
http://pdscvc.nic.in (follow "Report for Delhi" hyperlink; then follow "Compiled
Chapter" hyperlink).
70. See People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.
196 of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, July 12, 2006), available at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html#box l (follow "Order of 12
July 2006" hyperlink).
71. Report on Delhi: Executive Summary, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. Aniket Baksy et al., The PDS, Cash Transfers and Nutrition in Urban India 3
(Ctr. for Civil Soc'y, Working Paper No. 291, 2013), available at
https://ccsintemship.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/291_pds-and-cash-transferaniket-
aashna-aayushi.pdf; Rajita Varma, The 'Last Mile' Critique: Implementation and
Accessibility of PDS in Delhi 3 (Ctr. for Civil Soc'y, Working Paper No. 269, 2012),
available at http://ccs.in/intemship-papers/2012/269-implimentation-accessiblity-of-
pds-in-delhi_rajita-verma.pdf.
74. Varma, supra note 73, at 12.
75. Id.atll-13.
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per month or less. Some shops were open only two or three days per month
(and for only two to three hours on those days).7 The paper also found that
shopkeepers sold poor quality grain to TPDS cardholders, and they sold the
higher quality TPDS grain on the black market; shopkeepers marked cards
incorrectly in order to divert grains to the black market; and people had to
pay bribes to obtain TPDS cards (up to Rs. 4,000)." Despite these problems,
beneficiaries were reluctant to lodge complaints, fearing the hostility of the
shopkeepers.79 The second paper, from 2013, noted that the TPDS in Delhi
"appears to have actually gotten worse in recent times" and that, in some
localities the system is "barely functional."so The authors also noted that a
comparison with a 2009 study in Delhi (which the authors of the present
paper were unable to locate) revealed that "PDS functioning is nowhere near
uniform across the City of Delhi.""
A 2014 study on food insecurity in a resettlement colony in Delhi also
briefly discussed the TPDS.82 It found that over half of the respondents
holding a ration card were not regularly using the TPDS due to insufficient
quantity and poor quality of grains provided to them." The study also found
that the majority (75%) of the respondents using the TPDS were not getting
adequate rations for their families.84
IV. RATIONALE & METHODOLOGY
India is urbanizing rapidly-by 2030, 40% of India's population will
live in cities.s This represents an urban transformation at a scale and speed
that is, outside of China, unprecedented.86 At the end of this process, Delhi
and Mumbai will become two of the world's five largest cities." While this
transformation holds tremendous economic potential-urban India will
76. Id. at 11.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Varma, supra note 73, at 13.
80. Baksy et al., supra note 73, at 27-28.
81. Id. at 27 n.25.
82. Palanivel Chinnakali et al., Prevalence of Household-Level Food Insecurity and
Its Determinants in an Urban Resettlement Colony in North India, 32 J. HEALTH
POPULAR NUTRITION 227, 227 (2014).
83. Id. at 232.
84. Id.
85. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INDIA'S URBAN AWAKENING: BUILDING INCLUSIVE
CITIES, SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH 14 (2010), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/urbanization/urban-awakening-in-india.
86. Id. at 37.
87. Id. at 15.
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create 70% of the country's new jobs in the next twenty years"8-there is
also an increasing number of urban poor.89 Recent government estimates
indicate that 26% of India's urban population lives below the poverty line,
which is defined in urban areas as Rs. 1,407 per month or less in consumption
expenditure.90 This comes out to USD $0.72 per day." Moreover, many of
these people live in slums with limited or no access to basic sanitation or
government services,92 which leads to extremely poor health outcomes. For
example, a 2005 study found that one in ten slum children did not live to see
their fifth birthday.93 Given that urban slums are the fastest-growing sector
of India's popilation,94 this presents a potential health crisis.
One of the most pressing issues facing India's urban poor is food
insecurity, which runs as high as 51% in urban Delhi, 58% in Coimbatore,
79% in Mizoram, and up to 74% in urban Tamil Nadu.5 This forces some
people to skip or cut the size of meals,96 borrow from moneylenders at
extremely high interest rates to purchase food,97 or eat foods they do not want
to eat.98 Malnutrition, the most serious consequence of food insecurity, 99 is
also prevalent. By some estimates, 47% of Delhi's poor are malnourished,
88. Id. at 14.
89. Gov'T OF INDIA, INDIA: URBAN POVERTY REPORT 2009 FACTSHEET 1 (2009),
available at
http://www.in.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/india urban-povertyreport_2009.pdf.
90. Gov'TOF INDIA, REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP TO REVIEW THE METHODOLOGY
FOR MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY 4-5 (2014), available at
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/pov-rep0707.pdf.
91. Indian Rupee: Top INR Exchange Rates, XE.cOM,
http://www.xe.com/currency/inr-indian-rupee (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
92. See GOV'T OF INDIA, URBAN SLUMS IN INDIA 2012 ii-iii (2014) (noting that in 31%
of slums, no latrine is used by most of the residents; in 27%, there is no garbage disposal;
and in 7%, there is no electricity).
93. Kapil Yadav et al., Urbanization and Health Challenges: Need to Fast Track
Launch of the National Urban Health Mission, 36 INDIAN J. COMMUNITY MED. 3, 3
(2011) (discussing the National Family Health Survey-3 (2005-2006)).
94. Scott Baldauf, India's Bid to Boost Healthcare in Slums, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (May 27, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0527/p06s01 -wosc.html.
95. Palak Gupta et al., Coping Strategies Adopted by Households to Prevent Food
Insecurity in Urban Slums of Delhi, India, 3 J. FOOD SECURITY 6, 6 (2015) (reviewing
studies).
96. Siddharth Agarwal et al., Experiential Household Food Insecurity in an Urban
Underserved Slum of North India, I FOOD SECURITY 239, 244 (2009) ("'Cutting size of
meals or skipping meals' was sometimes or often faced by 23.9% households.").
97. Gupta et al., supra note 95, at 9.
98. Chinnakali et al., supra note 82, at 230 tbl.l.
99. Id. at 227.
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which is worse than many areas in Sub-Saharan Africa."o Children are at
particular risk-over half of India's poor urban children are stunted,'1 and
nearly half are underweight.10 2 In Delhi slums, more than one-third of
children under five are malnourished, and one-third of those children show
signs of severe wasting.0 3 Similar statistics exist for Mumbai," and a
recent study of twenty-six urban slums in Coimbatore found that nearly half
of the children suffer from some form of malnutrition.os
Thus, the functioning of the PDS in urban areas is crucially
important.106 However, this remains a neglected area of research, as most
scholarship focuses on rural areas.'0o One recent study, for example,
examined nine sample states and categorized the PDS as languishing,
reviving, or functioning properly, but it did not categorize Delhi or other
urban areas.0 8 The present study is intended to fill this gap. This research
is particularly timely because, first, data suggests that an increasing number
of urban Indians are using the PDS,'0 9 and second, the National Food
100. 'State of Malnutrition in Delhi Worse Than Sub-Sahara,' THE HINDU (May 7,
201 0),http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/state-of-
malnutrition-in-delhi-worse-than-subsaharaarticle762712.ece.
101. Agarwal et al., supra note 96, at 239.
102. Gov'T OF INDIA, HEALTH OF THE URBAN POOR IN INDIA KEY RESULTS FROM THE
NATIONAL FAMILY HEALTH SURVEY 3 (2006), available at
http://www.uhrc.in/downloads/wall-chart.pdf.
103. Nita Bhalla, More Than One Third of Delhi Slum Children Malnourished-
Survey, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2014), http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/delhi-slum-
children-survey-idlNDEEA3303220140404; see also Deaths Due to Malnutrition on the
Rise in Delhi, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (May 12, 2014),
http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/deaths-due-to-malnutrition-on-the-rise-in-
delhi/ ("Another report by department of woman and child development revealed that
the number of cases of severely malnourished children increased three times in the period
between April 2012 and January 2014, officials said.").
104. Madhavi Jayarajan, Tackling Malnutrition in Urban Slums!, CTR. FOR HEALTH
MKT. INNOVATIONS (Apr. 4, 2014), http://healthmarketinnovations.org/blog/tackling-
malnutrition-urban-slums-0 ("In Mumbai-India's financial and industrial capital-
more than 36% of the slum children are malnourished . . . .").
105. R. Sairam, Malnutrition High Among Urban Poor Children, THE HINDU (Mar.
31, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Coimbatore/malnutrition-high-among-
urban-poor-children/article4566729.ece; see also Jyoti Punwani, 'Malnutrition Kills
56,000 Children Annually in Urban Slums,' THE TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/interviews/Malnutrition-kills-56000-children-
annually-in-urban-slums/articleshow/7248634.cms.
106. See Bhalla, supra note 103; Jayarajan, supra note 104.
107. Khera, supra note 37, at 37.
108. Id.
109. Rukmini S., Households Using PDS Double in Seven Years, THE HINDU (June 29,
2015), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-households-using-the-public-
distribution-system-doubles-in-seven-years/article7367715.ece ("In urban India, the
66 [VOL. 12
2016] IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Security Act will further increase usage-it allows PDS benefits to be
granted to up to 50% of the urban population."o Therefore, it is important
for government officials, policymakers, and civil society to understand what
challenges might prevent these people from obtaining their entitlements.
The research questions for this study were: (1) What benefits do the
residents of urban slums derive from the PDS? (2) What barriers exist to the
proper implementation of the TPDS in Delhi? and (3) How can the TPDS in
Delhi be compared to the PDS in other states and in rural areas? Data was
collected primarily through the random household survey method in the slum
of Garhi, which is located near East of Kailash in the south block of Delhi.
Surveys were conducted with various stakeholders of the TPDS: household
beneficiaries, an Anganwadi,"I school staff, and fair price shop owners. The
surveys were conducted between November 2011 and January 2013.
Additional data was obtained through the filing of requests (RTIs) under the
Right to Information Act. CHLET faculty and students filed five RTIs
targeting various authorities within the Delhi Government regarding, e.g.,
the number of beneficiary households, the number and location of fair price
shops in certain areas, and the location of Anganwadis. The questions asked
in the RTIs are listed in Annexure 1.
A total of sixty-three respondents/households were surveyed-forty
women and twenty-three men. Thirty-three had a BPL card, nine had an
APL card, and twenty-one had an AAY card (four people had no card and
four others had more than one card). The average (and median) income was
Rs. 5,500 per month. We did a door-to-door survey of the locality (Garhi)
and spoke with the people present there for the purpose of this report. The
respondent households had varied levels of income, and each household's
economic status was recorded in terms of APL, BPL, and AAY. We verified
their ration cards before beginning the surveys-each type of ration card is
a distinct color, which allows for easy recognition. These cards are provided
for each family, and whenever a beneficiary receives some commodities
from a fair price shop, an entry is recorded on the ration card of the
proportion of households reporting they bought wheat from a ration shop has more than
tripled in seven years to 19 per cent, while the proportion of urban households buying
PDS rice has nearly doubled to 23 per cent.").
110. The National Food Security Act, 2013, No. 20, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 3(2)
(India) (providing that up to 50% of the urban population can receive food aid under the
TPDS).
S111. The Anganwadi worker is the community-based worker responsible for
implementing the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme. See Meenal
M Thakare, Knowledge of Anganwadi Workers and Their Problems in an Urban ICDS
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beneficiary. In addition to the household surveys, we also did open-ended
interviews with an Anganwadi worker in Garhi,l12 the person who ran the
mid-day meal scheme at a school near Garhi,"' and fair price shop owners." 14
This study has a number of limitations. First, due to time and access
constraints, the sample-size of the non-household respondents (e.g., school
staff, Anganwadi workers, and fair price shop owners) is small, and their
reported experiences may not be representative. Second, data was collected
over a succinct period of time, and follow up discussions over a longer period
may have provided more nuanced information. Third, since some
respondents were asked to provide information that could reflect negatively
on themselves or their superiors (salaries, problems, etc.) they may not have
been entirely forthcoming.
Despite these limitations, however, this study is reliable and provides
new information on the functioning of the TPDS in Delhi. It also highlights
the potential of additional research in urban areas to shape TPDS policy and
reform efforts. With additional studies such as ours, key weaknesses in the
TPDS can be identified and India's efforts to fight hunger can be improved.
V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Beneficiaries reported a number of significant problems with the
functioning of Delhi's TPDS, including the quality and quantity of the grains
received, corruption, and administrative and logistical issues. This part sets
forth this data, analyzing it in light of the government's obligations under the
National Food Security Act and the Right to Food Case.
A. Findings
First, the quality of food was reported to be substandard--63% of
respondents who answered this question indicated that the food was of poor
112. The household respondents directed us to the Anganwadi for the purpose of this
survey. We asked about the general functioning of the center. Questions were mostly
open ended; however, some questions relating to the menu and other problems were used
to better understand the functioning of the Anganwadi. See Interview with Anganwadi
Worker, in Garhi (Mar 3, 2012).
113. We visited the Government Boys Secondary School in Garhi and surveyed the
person involved with the mid-day meal scheme. Questions were mostly open ended and,
per his request, we have not mentioned his name in the results. See Interview with
Employee of Mid-Day Meal Scheme at Secondary School, in Garhi (Mar. 3, 2012).
114. This was the most challenging part. It was very difficult to meet with these people,
as most of shops were closed when we visited. This required multiple trips to Garhi for
the sole purpose of surveying the fair price shop owners. We asked about the schedule
of the stores and the quality of the food. See Interview with Fair Price Shop Owner, in
Garhi (Mar. 3, 2012).
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or very poor quality. Another 21% replied that the food was of average
quality (only 16% reported "good" quality). According to one person, "five
out of every twenty kilograms is rubbish.""' The grains are also dirty-
"When they sweep, the dirt is put in the bories [bags].""'6 In most cases, the
grains could be cleaned within a few hours,' but in some cases, they
required numerous rounds of cleaning and drying that took several days to
complete."'
Second, a number of respondents indicated that the amount of the food
rations was insufficient. Nearly one-half (7 out of 16) of answering
respondents reported that they sometimes had to skip meals or spend extra
money on grains, and another four" 9 stated that the ration is simply not
enough. One 35-year-old woman reported that she skipped meals or had to
buy additional grain "very often" because "nothing is left by the last
week."'2 0 Another woman stated that she spends approximately Rs. 2,000
per month on outside groceries.'2 ' A related problem is that the beneficiaries
are not given their full share. BPL cardholders were entitled, at the time of
the surveys, to twenty-five kilograms of wheat and ten kilograms of rice.
However, most people received far less than this.'22 AAY cardholders were
entitled to the same amounts, but most received far less.'2 3 In addition, both
BPL and AAY cardholders are entitled to some amount of sugar and
kerosene, but only one respondent reported getting either (and she was
115. Interview with Household Respondent 59, in Garhi (Jan. 11, 2013).
116. Interview with Household Respondent 56, in Garhi (Jan. 11, 2013).
117. Average cleaning times: Household Respondent 4 (few hours); 7 (30 minutes); 9
(few hours); 10 (2 hours); 11 (1 hour); 12 (2 hours); 14 (1 hour); 15 (1 hour); 16 (2
hours); 17 (1 hour); 18 (1-2 hours); 19 (1 hour); 20 (2-3 hours); 21 (1 hour); 22 (1 hour);
23 (2-3 hours); 24 (1-2 hours); 26 (30 minutes); 28 (1-2 hours); 29 (1 hour); 32 (10-15
minutes).
118. Average cleaning time: Household Respondent 1 (2-3 days); 2 (3 days); 3 (2-3
days).
119. Household Respondent 30 ("The ration is never enough."); 34 ("It's not enough
at all."); 39 ("Not sufficient ration."); 49 ("Not enough ration.").
120. Interview with Household Respondent 2, in Garhi (Feb. 26, 2012).
121. Interview with Household Respondent I1, in Garhi (Mar. 25, 2012).
122. BPL cardholders reported receiving the following quantities. Wheat: Household
Respondent 1 (15 kg); 4 (10 kg); 10 (15 kg); 15 (15 kg); 17 (15 kg); 20 (15 kg); 21 (15
kg); 22 (17 kg); 26 (15 kg); 28 (15 kg); 31 (15 kg); 32 (10 kg). Rice: Household
Respondent 1 (5 kg); 4 (10 kg); 10 (5 kg); 15 (5 kg); 17 (5 kg); 20 (5 kg); 21 (5 kg); 22
(25 kg); 26 (5 kg); 28 (5 kg); 31 (5 kg); 32 (7 kg).
123. AAY cardholders reported receiving the following quantities. Wheat: Household
Respondent 3 (15 kg); 8 (20 kg); 9 (15 kg); 12 (25 kg); 14 (15 kg); 16 (15 kg); 18 (20
kg); 23 (10 kg); 24 (10 kg). Rice: Household Respondent 3 (5 kg); 8 (5 kg); 9 (5 kg); 12
(10 kg); 12 (10 kg); 14 (5 kg); 16 (5 kg); 23 (5 kg); 24 (5 kg).
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getting only sugar).124  This forces at least some households to spend
additional money to purchase these items. One person reported, "It's been 7
to 8 years, but we didn't get any sugar. "125
Corruption is also a problem. Some shopkeepers mark ration cards for
supplies that he beneficiaries are not given.12 6 These supplies are then sold
on the black market-one beneficiary reported that the local shop owner
lives in a large house that would normally be outside of his means.127 Also,
some shopkeepers deviate from the government-mandated prices.12 8 At the
time of the survey, Delhi fair price shops sold rice, wheat, sugar, and
kerosene oil.1 29 These essentials were provided at subsidized prices and in
quantities as follows:'30
APL BPL AAY
Quantity* Price Quantity Price Quantity Price
(kg) (Rs/kg) (kg) (Rs/kg) (kg) (Rs/kg)
Wheat 25 7.05 25 4.80 25 2.00
Rice 10 9.25 10 6.30 10 3.00
Sugar 0 0 6 13.65 6 13.50
Kerosene 0 0 12.5 14.83 12.5 14.83
(per litre)
124. Interview with Household Respondent 29, in Garbi (Aug. 12, 2012).
125. Interview with Household Respondent 51, in Garhi (Oct. 23, 2012).
126. Household Respondent 9 ("Some entries have been over-written."); 37 ("When
there is sugar written, there is no sugar given."); 38 ("They have written sugar entries,
but don't give it."); 41 ("They have written sugar, but have never given us sugar."); 51
("Does entry for sugar as well but never gives.").
127. Interview with Household Respondent 22, in Garhi (May 16, 2012) ("There is a
black market for ration crops, and shopkeepers benefit the most from this. My local PDS
shop owner owns a huge house that would normally be outside of his means."); Interview
with Household Respondent 63, in Garhi (Jan. 11, 2013) ("The shopkeepers ell them in
black.").
128. Interview with Household Respondent 14 (Mar. 25, 2012) ("All the ration[s]
should be provide[d] at government approved rates."); Interview with Household
Respondent 23, in Garhi (May 16, 2012) (stating that shopkeepers "give[] at the wrong
rates").
129. Public Distribution System, Gov'T OF DELHI,
http://delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/doitdscsc/DSCSC/Home/Activities/Distribution
+under+PDS/Public+Distribution+System/ (last updated Mar. 31, 2016).
130. See Varma, supra note 73, at 8 tbl. 1; Tarun Nangia, Kerosene May Give Sheila
the Onion Bite, NEW INDIAN ExPRESS (June 12, 2011),
http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/article435349.ece (noting that
kerosene rations in Delhi were reduced to 10.5 liters); GOv'T OF NCT OF DELil, supra
note 42, at 256 (noting that BPL families are entitled to 25 kg of wheat and 10 kg of rice
per month).
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*This amount can change, depending on supplies obtained from the
central government.
Thus, for AAY cardholders, the scheduled price for wheat and rice was
Rs. 2/kg and Rs. 3/kg respectively. However, nearly all AAY respondents
who provided price data were being charged higher prices, often more than
twice the scheduled price.' 3 ' This is particularly problematic because AAY
cardholders are the "poorest of the poor,"l 32 and thus not in a position to
cover these unlawful expenses.
The lack of an effective complaint mechanism makes it difficult to
remedy these problems. Several beneficiaries suggested that, if they
complain, the shopkeepers threaten to cancel their ration cards.'3 More
generally, their complaints are not taken seriously and nothing happens when
they do complain.'34  Although the TPDS does have a grievance
mechanism,' it is clear that, in practice, the beneficiaries do not feel that
this mechanism is at all effective.' 3 6
Beneficiaries face several other difficulties. Fair price shops
sometimes run out of supplies, making it difficult to get one's ration,' and
131. AAY cardholders reported paying the following prices. Wheat: Household
Respondent 3 (Rs. 3/kg); 8 (Rs. 7/kg); 9 (Rs. 5/kg); 12 (Rs. 3/kg); 14 (Rs. 5/kg); 16 (Rs.
5/kg); 18 (Rs. 5/kg); 23 (Rs. 9/kg); 24 (Rs. 5/kg). Rice: Household Respondent 3 (Rs.
2/kg); 8 (Rs. 5/kg); 9 (Rs. 7/kg); 12 (Rs. 2/kg); 14 (Rs. 7/kg); 16 (Rs. 7/kg); 23 (Rs.
12/kg); 24 (Rs. 7/kg).
132. Antyodaya Scheme: Many States Yet to Identify Poor, supra note 29.
133. Household Respondent 20 ("Complaining should be possible. Currently it isn't
because the shopkeepers threaten to cancel their ration cards."); 47 ("No one will listen
to us. He'll cancel our cards."); 51 ("Tried telling him, but he threatened to cancel the
card."); 56 ("If we say we will complain, he will be like, "Who will you complain to, if
we shut down you won't get anything.").
134. Household Respondent 30 ("We went to complain once, but nothing happens.");
32 ("No one complains, so that's why I can't complain as well."); 37 ("We can't tell the
Pradhan because they don't listen to him also."); 54 ("He'll give what he wants. He won't
listen."); 55 ("We complain to the Pradhan; he says he can't do anything. People need to
get together and complain.").
135. See Guide on Frequent Complaints and Grievances, Gov'T OF NCT OF DELHI,
http://www.delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/doit-food/Food/Home/Complaints+And+Gr
ievances/Guide+on+Frequent+complaints+And+Grievances (last updated Mar. 22,
2014).
136. See, e.g., Household Respondent 4 (noting that he wants "a proper complaint
mechanism").
137. Household Respondent 3 ("Grain runs out very often in the shops."); 4 ("Grain
supply runs out many times."); 46 ("If it's not there, they don't give."). A fair price shop
owner provided a different view, claiming that there is "no shortage of grain." Survey of
Fair Price Shop Owner, in Garhi, Delhi (Mar. 3, 2012).
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at times, rations are given out late.' The shops themselves are open only a
few days per month (sometimes only once per month),13 9 contradicting the
claim by one owner that his shop is open every day except for Tuesdays.140
Respondents also explained that it can be difficult to obtain a card or a
replacement card,41 and that bribes (up to Rs. 3,000) are sometimes required
to get one.142 More generally, administrative problems are difficult to fix,1 4 3
and one person reported that he was not given the proper card based on his
income (e.g., was given a BPL card instead of an AAY card)."
The numerous problems with these programs led some beneficiaries to
conclude that they would be better off if the government simply distributed
money instead of the foodstuffs themselves.145
B. Analysis
The PDS in Garhi is beset by a number of difficulties that suggest that
the central and state governments are not meeting their obligations under the
Right to Food Case, and to the extent that this situation persists today, under
the National Food Security Act (enacted after our data was collected).146
Many people reported receiving low (or even very low) quality grains,
which contravenes the very purpose of the National Food Security Act-to
138. Household Respondent 33 ("We get our ration very late."); 63 (noting that he
doesn't get his ration on time and that they keep telling him to "come back later").
139. Household Respondent 16 ("Shop opens only once in a month."); 4 ("Two days
in a month are inadequate to procure ration."); 57 ("Three days a month."); 14 ("Shops
should open more often . . . ."); 15 ("Shops should be opened more often."); 48 ("It
should open more often."); 63 ("Whenever I go, the shop is shut.").
140. Survey of Fair Price Shop Owner, in Garhi, Delhi (Mar. 3, 2012). Team members
also visited this shop on a Saturday at 12:45 p.m. and found the shop to be closed.
141. Household Respondent 25 ("We have been trying to make it, but they aren't
making it for us... ."); 43 ("My Bhabhi had a Yellow card, which was lost. They tried
to apply for another card, but they couldn't.").
142. Interview with Anonymous Respondent, in Garhi (Jan. I1, 2013).
143. Interview with Household Respondent 40, in Garhi (Aug. 12, 2012) ("They have
changed my card, and on this, my child's name is not mentioned, so I'm doubtful as to
whether I'll even get enough ration."); Interview with Household Respondent 63, in
Garhi (Jan. I1, 2013) (stating that the new shop "refuses to give ration as card has the
old shop name on it"); Interview with Household Respondent 46, in Garhi (Oct. 23, 2012)
("All five children don't have their name on the card.").
144. Interview with Household Respondent 4, in Garhi (Feb. 26, 2012) (applied for
AAY, but was given BPL).
145. Household Respondent 59 ("The government should just give us money; that
would be much better."); 63 ("They should just give us money instead of grains.").
146. BALANI, supra note 27, at 1.
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"ensur[e] access to adequate quantity of quality food."'4 7 Moreover, under
the Act, the very definition of the word "foodgrains" incorporates minimum
quality standards to be set by the Central Government.148 Thus, where a
portion of a person's given allotment is "rubbish,"l49 that person has not been
given his full share of foodgrains. Also, the Supreme Court has directed the
Central Government and the Food Corporation of India to ensure at least
"fair average quality grain" for the Mid-Day Meal Scheme.0̀
Some shops run out of grain or do not have adequate supplies.'"' This
raises several possible violations of the Act.'52 The Central Government is
required to allocate sufficient grains to the states under the TPDS.'" In the
case of a grain shortage, the Central Government must provide funds to the
states to cover the shortfall."s4 Also, the Central Government is responsible
for transporting foodgrains to state depots and the states are responsible for
transporting the grains to the fair price shops.' If a State Government fails
to supply the full entitlements, it must pay the beneficiaries a food security
allowance.'6 In addition, both the Central and State Governments have to
introduce schemes to ensure that beneficiaries receive their foodgrain
entitlements.157
The government's failure to curb corruption in the TPDS, particularly
in fair price shops, is also a breach of its obligations.' States are responsible
for ensuring "actual delivery" of the foodgrains to the entitled persons at the
specified prices,'59 but our results indicate that beneficiaries are not getting
their full shares (likely due to diversion of supplies to the black market) and
some are being overcharged.'6 0 Also, household respondents reported (and
our team's spot-check of one shop confirmed) that fair price shops do not
147. The National Food Security Act, 2013, No. 20, Acts of Parliament, 2013, pmbl.
(India)
148. Id. § 2(5) (.'[F]oodgrains' means rice, wheat or coarse grains or any combination
thereof conforming to such quality norms as may be determined, by order, by the Central
Government from time to time.").
149. See supra note 1 15 and accompanying text.
150. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28.html.
151. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
152. The National Food Security Act, 2013, § 22.
153. Id.
154. Id. § 23.
155. Id. §§ 22(4)(c), 24(2)(a-b).
156. Id. §§ 8, 24(4).
157. The National Food Security Act, 2013, § 12(2)(h).
158. Id. § 24(2)(b).
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
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keep regular hours and are often closed,'6 ' despite the Supreme Court's order
that the government "ensure that the ration shops remain open throughout
the month, during fixed hours."1 62 The extent of violations reported by the
beneficiaries suggests that the oversight required by the Act is not being
implemented. Under the Act, States must conduct periodic social audits of
fair price shopsl63 and set up Vigilance Committees and a State Food
Commission to monitor the Act's implementation.'I Of particular note, the
State Commission can inquire into violations of the Act suo moto.'6 ' The
Supreme Court further ordered that the government should "not show any
laxity" regarding corrupt or careless shop owners.166 However, our data
suggests that, in practice, there is little oversight. In fact, the Commissioner
of the Delhi Department of Food, Supplies, and Consumer Affairs admitted
that the vigilance committees in Delhi were defunct and ineffective (at least
as of 2007).117
These problems are exacerbated by a lack of a meaningful complaint
mechanism. The Act requires each state to create an internal grievance
redressal mechanism and appoint a District Grievance Redressal Officer for
each district for "expeditious and effective redressal of grievances."'68 The
Supreme Court has also specifically ordered the government to ensure that
"there is an effective mechanism in place to ensure speedy and effective
redressal of grievances."169
A number of people reported administrative difficulties with the
system, such as obtaining a ration card, getting a replacement card, or adding
family members' names to the card.170 This may constitute a violation of the
161. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
162. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Order, May 8, 2002), available at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may8.html.
163. The National Food Security Act, 2013, § 28.
164. See id. §§ 29(2) (noting that the Vigilance Committee shall "regularly supervise
the implementation of all schemes under this Act" and inform the District Grievance
Redressal Officer of any violation), 16(6)(a) (noting that the State Food Commission
shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Act).
165. Id. § 16(6)(b).
166. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, May 2, 2003), available at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html.
167. Report on Delhi: Executive Summary, supra note 69.
168. The National Food Security Act, 2013, §§ 14-15.
169. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (S.C. Interim Order, Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://secommissioners.org/CourtOrders/Orders/allfoodschemes_281101 .pdf.
170. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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government's obligation to identify the households eligible for food
assistance and ensure actual delivery of the foodgrains to entitled persons. '7
These findings contrast in several ways with those in other recent
studies. Reetika Khera's 2011 report on the TPDS in nine states found that
three-fourths of cardholders were getting their full quota,172 and the 2012
Working Paper by the Centre for Civil Society found that most BPL and
AAY cardholders in Delhi were regularly receiving their full entitlements
(including sugar).173 However, our surveys indicate that in Delhi, both BPL
and AAY respondents do not receive their full entitlement.17 4 Khera's report
also found few instances of overcharging,'17 but we found that, in Delhi,
many AAY respondents are over-paying for grain.' In addition, while a
majority of people in Delhi (63%) complained of poor quality grain, only
15% in Khera's study reported the same.177 Khera also suggests that many
states had improved regularity in shop hours; 78 however, Delhi shops do not
appear to have made similar progress.'79 A more recent article by Khera and
Jean Dreze posits, nationally, high leakages (i.e., grain released by the FCI
that does not reach TPDS consumers) in the APL quota, and much lower
leakages in the BPL quota.80 However, we found that many BPL consumers
are not receiving their full share of grain, which may suggest high leakage
from the BPL quota in Delhi.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Implications for Reform
The data collected confirms that the TPDS in Delhi's slums has not
improved to the extent documented in other states. This may seem
counterintuitive, given that we would expect urban PDS beneficiaries to be
more educated, urban PDS shops to be more accessible, and oversight to be
171. The National Food Security Act, 2013, §§ 10, 24(2)(a-b).
172. Khera, supra note 37, at 41 ("Three-quarters of respondents reported getting their
full quota in the nine survey states.").
173. Varma, supra note 73, at 12.
174. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
175. Khera, supra note 37, at 41 ("There were hardly any instances of "overcharging"
(charging more than the official issue price) for PDS grain.").
176. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
177. Khera, supra note 37, at 42 ("[N]early half (47%) said it was of 'fair' quality and
15% said that the grain they received was of poor quality.").
178. Id. ("There has been much improvement in the predictability and regularity of
PDS distribution and opening of FPSs.").
179. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
180. Dreze & Khera, supra note 35, at 40.
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stronger in urban areas.' However, there are several reasons why reforms
to the PDS may be more difficult in urban areas.
Urban residents are much less likely to use the PDS.'82 At the national
level, 46% of the rural population consumes rice from PDS, compared to
23% of the urban population.18 3 Within individual states, the disparity is
even greater-for example, in Andhra Pradesh (87% vs. 45%), Chhattisgarh
(67% vs. 42%), and Odisha (54% vs. 18%).184 A similar pattern exists, both
at the national and state levels, for wheat, sugar, and kerosene.'8 5 One reason
for this is that a smaller percentage of urban residents have BPL cards
compared to rural residents, with particularly large disparities in Andhra
Pradesh (85% vs. 49%), Karnataka (64% vs. 29%), Maharashtra (28% vs.
5%), Assam (40% vs. 13%), and West Bengal (34% vs. 11 %).' While this
may be attributable, in part, to higher poverty rates in rural areas,' there are
also urban-specific barriers to obtaining a ration card. Several studies and
reports have noted that it can be difficult for PDS beneficiaries to replace
their card after moving to a new location,' and with more and more people
moving to cities, this will become an increasingly urban problem. Also, a
permanent residence is often required to obtain a ration card,"' which will
181. See, e.g., KARTHIK MURALIDHARAN ET AL. , ASSESSING THE SCOPE FOR CASH
TRANSFERS IN LIEU OF THE TPDS IN RURAL AND URBAN BIHAR 6 tbl. 1 (2011) (noting
that BPL cardholders in urban Bihar are more educated than those in rural Bihar).
182. GOv'T OF INDIA, PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND OTHER SOURCES OF
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, 2011-12 19 stint. 3 (2015).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id at 20, 22-23.
186. Id. at 31 stmt. 12.
187. See GOv'T OF INDIA, PRESS NOTE ON POVERTY ESTIMATES, 2011-12 6 tbl. 2
(2013) (comparing urban and rural poverty rates).
188. SONALDE B. DESAl ET AL., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA: CHALLENGES FOR A
SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 198 (2010) ("The most common reasons cited by respondents
for not having a PDS card [include] ... the household has moved but the card has not
been transferred (10 per cent) . . . ."); Srinivas Goli, Conundrums in Public Distribution
System in India: An Assessment by States and Social Groups, 9 INDIAN DEV. REV. 301,
307 (2011) ("Moreover, change in residence... also contributes reasonably for not
having a ration card."); COMMISSIONERS OF THE SUPREME COURT, EIGHTH REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE SUPREME COURT 67 (2008), available at
http://www.hrn.org/hrn/pdf/rtf/reports/Eight%20report%20.harsh%2tanveef`/o2Ofinal
%20aug%2020%2008.pdf ("For migrants, accessing the PDS has become increasingly
difficult. Those who move from other states generally do not have ration cards.").
189. L.N.P. MOHANTY & SWATI MOHANTY, SLUM IN INDIA 60 (2005) ("Most of the
slum dwellers are denied issue of ration cards for not having permanent residential
identification."); Saxena, supra note 35, at 5 ("A large number of homeless and poor
people living in unauthorised colonies in urban areas have been denied ration cards . . .
!"); COMMISSIONERS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 188, at 60 ("Not having any
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disproportionately affect the urban poor. There are more homeless people in
urban areas than rural areas, and homelessness is decreasing in rural areas
but increasing in urban areas.'90 Moreover, many urban slum dwellers do
not have legal tenancy rights,'"' and with the slum population rapidly
increasing, 19 many potential PDS beneficiaries will not be able to access the
system.
Even where they have cards, urban cardholders are less likely to
actually use their card and avail their benefits.'93 One study in South Delhi
found that less than half of eligible beneficiaries were regularly using the
PDS due to the insufficient quantity and poor quality of grains provided.19 4
The lower participation rate in urban areas makes it easier for
corruption to go unnoticed and provides less incentive for politicians to get
involved with PDS reform.'" In states that have made dramatic
improvements to their PDS, political will has been identified as a crucial
proof of identification and address proof means not being able to claim BPL or
Antyodaya cards and the other food schemes, which in practice depend on this.").
190. D. Kumuda, Homeless Population in India: A Study, 3 GLOBAL J. FOR RES.
ANALYSIS 54, 54 (2014) (comparing homelessness in rural and urban India in 2001 and
2011).
191. Renu Khosla, Informality as the Root of Urban Vulnerability, WORLD BANK,
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,
,contentMDK:23394670-pagePK:64165401-piPK:64165026-theSitePK:476883,00.ht
ml (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
192. See, e.g., J. Chadchan & R. Shankar, An Analysis of Urban Growth Trends in the
Post-Economic Reforms Period in India, I INT'L J. SUSTAINABLE BUILT ENV'T. 36, 45
(2012) ("[T]he present growth of slum population is at least three times higher than the
growth of urban population .... ).
193. SAMUEL PAUL ET AL., WHO BENEFITS FROM INDIA'S PUBLIC SERVICES? 85-86
(2006); M H Suryanarayana, Agflation and the Public Distribution System, 43 EcON. &
POL. WKLY. 13, 14 (2008) ("Though 90 per cent of the rural and 77 per cent of the urban
households in Tamil Nadu had ration cards, 79 per cent of the rural and 48 per cent of
the urban households reported having obtained rice from the PDS for their
consumption . . ..").
194. Chinnakali et al., supra note 82, at 232.
195. Abhijit Sen Himanshu, Why Not a Universal Food Security Legislation?, 46
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 38,42 (2011) ("Higher participation almost certainly makes it more
difficult to divert supplies from PDS shops and also puts pressure on state governments
to carry out governance reforms."); Khera, supra note 37, at 37 ("[R]evival of the PDS
in many states appears to be linked with ... expanded coverage."); Jean Dreze & Reetika
Khera, Chhattisgarh Shows the Way, THE HINDU (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://www.thehindu.com/features/magazine/chhattisgarh-shows-the-
way/article881869.ece ("Today, close to 80 per cent of the rural population .. . is entitled
to PDS grain at either one or two rupees per kilo. The fact that most rural households
have a strong stake in the PDS has generated immense pressure on the system (ration
shops in particular) to deliver.").
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factor,'96 but there is less political benefit to reforms in urban areas.
Unfortunately, the National Food Security Act ensures that this will
continue-it allows benefits to be given to up to 75% of the rural population
but only 50% of the urban population.'9 7 There is, however, little basis for
this disparity. According to recent government figures, 31% of the rural
population and 26% of the urban population live below the poverty line.' 98
Moreover, in nine states, the urban poverty rate is actually higher than the
rural poverty rate, and in at least three others, the rates are nearly equal.'99
The Act's approach will become even more problematic as India's urban
population is expected to grow from 30% in 2008 to 40% by 2030.200
B. Importance ofa Working Complaint Mechanism
Our findings also underscore the need for a working complaint
mechanism. Both our research and that reported by the Centre for Civil
Society in 2012 indicate that many TPDS beneficiaries in Delhi refrain from
reporting misconduct or corruption by fair price shop owners out of fear of
hostility or retaliation (e.g., the shop owner may stop selling to them).20 1
Thus, the beneficiaries-the people best suited to identify problems and
corruption-are lost as an accountability resource. This is a key area of
reform-an improved complaint mechanism through active helplines helped
196. Dreze & Khera, supra note 195 ("Ultimately, however, it is political will that
seems to matter most. Somehow, the PDS became a political priority in Chhattisgarh and
a decision was made to turn it around, instead of siding with the corrupt dealers who
were milking the system. When political bosses firmly direct the bureaucracy to fix a
dysfunctional system, things begin to change."); Dreze & Khera, supra note 35, at 41
("Opposition parties are helping [beneficiaries] to know their rights and demand their
due. All this has put the entire system under tremendous pressure to perform . . . ."); Jean
Dreze, How Bihar Mended Its Ways, THE HINDU (May 15, 2015),
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/jean-dreze-on-bihars-improved-public-
distribution-system/article7206648.ece ("[T]he public distribution system and the
National Food Security Act have become politically charged issues in Bibar .... The
run-up to Lok Sabha elections last year, and to Assembly elections this year, seems to
have prompted the Bihar government o initiate serious PDS reforms. Opposition parties,
for their part, are constantly challenging the government's claims and keeping it on its
toes.").
197. The National Food Security Act, 2013, No. 20, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 3(2)
(India).
198. Gov'T OF INDIA, supra note 90, at 5.
199. Gov'T OF INDIA, NATIONAL HEALTH PROFILE 30 (2011) (noting that urban poverty
is higher in Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Meghalaya,
Nagaland, Punjab, and Uttarakhand; and the urban poverty rate is nearly equal in
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Chandigarh).
200. McKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 85, at 15 ex. 1.
201. Varma, supra note 73, at 13.
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bring about dramatic improvements in Chhattisgarh's PDS.202 Recently,
Delhi's government has taken important steps in this regard-in October
2014, the Department of Food, Supplies, and Consumer Affairs began
accepting complaints through its Facebook page, which has led to several
fair price shops being fined.203
C. Gendered Impact of a Weak PDS
Finally, the authors note that the problems identified above in Delhi's
TPDS will have a disproportionate impact on impoverished women and girls.
In some South Asian cultures, women are "a residual category in intra-
household food distribution, eating after men and the children and making
do with what is left." 204 Even when women are in charge of food distribution,
they may give preference to their husbands and children at the cost of their
own needs, especially when food is scarce.205 In addition, the preference for
male children often results in parents giving their male children a more
varied (and more nutritious) diet.206 Research has confirmed these trends in
India specifically. Studies in Punjab, for example, have found that adult
women consume fewer calories than men, and young boys are given more
milk and fat than girls.207 Another study of villages in four Indian states
found that when families face food shortages, women reduce their food
consumption as a first step to ensure other family members are not
deprived.208 Of particular relevance to the present study, there are gender
disparities in other government nutrition programs-in 2004, the World
Bank noted that all of the positive nutritional benefits of ICDS Anganwadi
centers accrued to boys, not girls.209 More generally, numerous studies have
found that Indian girls and woman are more likely to be malnourished.21 0
202. Dreze & Khera, supra note 195.
203. Facebook Nails Over a Dozen Delhi Fair Price Shop Owners, THE HINDU (Nov.
10, 2014), http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/facebook-nails-over-a-dozen-
fair-price-shop-owners/article658235 .ece.
204. Nira Ramachandran, Women and Food Security in South Asia 12 (UNU-WIDER





208. Id. at 12.
209. WORLD BANK, ATTAINING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN INDIA vi
(2004).
210. See, e.g., NEELAM SOOD, MALNOURISHMENT AMONG CHILDREN IN INDIA:
LINKAGES WITH COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND SCHOOL PARTICIPATION 12 (2010) ("A
marked gender difference in malnutrition has been reported in many studies, with higher
numbers of girls being malnourished."); Premananda Bharati et al., Growth and
79
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Thus, difficulties and inefficiencies in the TPDS will most directly affect the
nutritional status of India's poorest women and girls.
VII. CONCLUSION
This study documents how India's PDS is failing one of the country's
most vulnerable populations-urban slum dwellers. Inefficiency and
corruption deprive hungry slum families of desperately needed food
assistance.2 11 Political will is essential to improve this situation, but the
lower usage of the system in urban areas, in part due to bureaucratic
difficulties that disproportionately affect urban residents, may prevent this
from happening.2 12 Unfortunately, the National Food Security Act's cap on
benefits in urban areas is likely to ensure that urban under-utilization
continues.2 13
However, this research was conducted before the National Food
Security Act was enacted in September 2013.214 Under the Act, priority
households are entitled to five kilograms of foodgrains per person per month
at subsidized prices, and AAY households are entitled to thirty-five
kilograms of foodgrains per household per month at the same prices.2 15 State
Governments are required to come up with guidelines to identify eligible
households,216 which (as mentioned) can include up to 75% of the rural
population and up to 50% of the urban population.217 The Act further
requires the State and Central Governments to work to reform the PDS,
including by ensuring doorstep delivery of grains to TPDS outlets,
maintaining computerized records, ensuring full transparency of the records,
Nutritional Status of Pre-School Children in India: Rural-Urban and Gender
Diferences, 33 COLLEGIUM ANTROPOLOGICUM 7, 7 (2009) (finding that, in urban areas,
a higher percentage of girls were underweight or stunted); Manu & N. Khetarpaul,
Gender Differences in Food Consumption Pattern and Nutrient Intake of Indian Pre-
School Children (3-4 Years) in Haryana State, 18 NUTRITION & HEALTH 141, 145 (2006)
("Intake of energy by boys was significantly . .. higher than that of girls which may be
due to their lower intake of cereals, milk and milk products, roots and tubers, sugar and
jaggery than [by the] boys.").
211. See Dreze, supra note 33.
212. See Saxena, supra note 35, at 65.
213. The National Food Security Act, 2013, No. 20, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 3(2)
(India).
214. National Food Security Bill Becomes Law, USDA (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/National%2Food%2OSecu
rity%2OBill%20Becomes%2OLawNew%2ODelhiIndia_9-16-2013.pdf. The text of
the Act is available at http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/202013.pdf.
215. The National Food Security Act, 2013, § 3(1).
216. Id. § 10.
217. Id. § 3(2).
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and diversifying the commodities provided.2 18 Each State Government must
also set up a Vigilance Committee to supervise the implementation of the
Act,2 19 create an internal grievance redressal mechanism,220 and constitute a
State Food Commission to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the
Act and inquire into complaints.22' Since the Act made dramatic changes to
the PDS that are now being implemented, additional research is needed to
assess whether the system continues to struggle in urban slums or whether it
has improved.
There is at least some reason to believe that the Act is bringing about
positive change-data collected in December 2014, for example, found
"major improvements" in Bihar's PDS, with cardholders receiving close to
80% of their entitlements.2 22 The respondent households also reported high
satisfaction with the quality of rice and wheat and few households were
wrongly excluded from the system.22 3 Data collected in Madhya Pradesh in
July 2015 indicates a "sea change" in the performance of the PDS compared
to two years earlier, with improved coverage, more beneficiaries receiving
their full (or close to full) entitlements, and more regular distribution
schedules.224 In addition, a six-state study conducted by the National
Council of Applied Economic Sciences in 2014 found that states that had
implemented the Act had fewer errors in identifying PDS beneficiaries and
lower grain leakage from the PDS than states that had not yet implemented
the Act.2 25 However, all of these studies also found that significant problems
still remain.226
218. Id. § 12.
219. Id. § 29.
220. The National Food Security Act, 2013, § 14.
221. Id. § 16.
222. Dreze & Khera, supra note 35, at 41-42.
223. Id. at 42 tbl. 4.
224. Jean Dreze, Reetika Khera, and Jessica Pudussery, Food Security: Bihar on the
Move, 50 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 44, 51 (2015).
225. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF APPLIED ECONOMIC RESEARCH, EVALUATION STUDY OF
TARGETED PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN SELECTED STATES 83 (2015).
226. Id. at xv-xix; Drbze, Khera, and Pudussery, supra note 225, at 48-49.
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VII. ANNEXURE I
1. List of the total number of ration cards issued mentioning the name of
the household, number of members, card number, type of card, and
quantity of food grain supplied to each household.
2. A detailed list of the different types of card holders (BPL, APL, and
AAY) in the slum.
3. A list of the total number of PDS shops (Ration Shops/Fair Price Shops)
in South Delhi.
4. A separate and detailed list of the number of PDS shops in and around
Garhi in East Kailash.
5. A list of the total number of the AAY cardholders in North and South
Delhi separately.
6. A separate and detailed list of the number of BPL cardholders in North
and South Delhi separately.
7. Please give a list of the number of APL cardholders in North and South
Delhi separately.
8 A list of the commodities, which are supposed to be given to the different
cardholders for subsidized rates, mentioning the price of each
commodity as fixed by the Government of NCT of Delhi.
9. A list of the total number of PDS shops (Ration Shops) in North Delhi.
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